I appreciate your pushback, and I agree—I should have clarified my point more. My critique wasn’t that Gulf states were strictly backing “Wahhabi proxies,” but rather that the long-standing coalition of Wahhabi clerics and political rulers has shaped the way Gulf countries engage in regional conflicts.
While Wahhabism has historically been a state-backed ideology in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf’s involvement in Syria was more geopolitical than religious. Saudi Arabia and Qatar supported opposition factions early on, not necessarily for ideological reasons, but to counter Iranian influence and the Assad regime. However, their backing was often fragmented, and their interests didn’t always align.
The UAE, on the other hand, has taken a different approach—it has been largely anti-Islamist, opposing both Iran-backed forces and jihadist groups. It had even reopened diplomatic ties with Assad, seeing his regime as a counterbalance to Turkey and Islamist factions.
That being said, I do think Wahhabi/Salafist elements played a role in shaping some of the factions that emerged in Syria, even if they weren’t explicitly backed as proxies by Gulf governments. Wealthy Gulf donors (acting independently of their states) did fund jihadist groups, and Saudi Arabia’s historical promotion of Wahhabism helped create conditions where radical factions could gain traction.
So, I should have been clearer: Gulf intervention in Syria wasn’t necessarily about promoting Wahhabism, but the historical influence of Wahhabi clerics on Gulf foreign policy has had ripple effects in the region. Thanks again for the comment!
Learned a lot of information from your article but learned even more from your response to a comment. Thank you again
I appreciate your pushback, and I agree—I should have clarified my point more. My critique wasn’t that Gulf states were strictly backing “Wahhabi proxies,” but rather that the long-standing coalition of Wahhabi clerics and political rulers has shaped the way Gulf countries engage in regional conflicts.
While Wahhabism has historically been a state-backed ideology in Saudi Arabia, the Gulf’s involvement in Syria was more geopolitical than religious. Saudi Arabia and Qatar supported opposition factions early on, not necessarily for ideological reasons, but to counter Iranian influence and the Assad regime. However, their backing was often fragmented, and their interests didn’t always align.
The UAE, on the other hand, has taken a different approach—it has been largely anti-Islamist, opposing both Iran-backed forces and jihadist groups. It had even reopened diplomatic ties with Assad, seeing his regime as a counterbalance to Turkey and Islamist factions.
That being said, I do think Wahhabi/Salafist elements played a role in shaping some of the factions that emerged in Syria, even if they weren’t explicitly backed as proxies by Gulf governments. Wealthy Gulf donors (acting independently of their states) did fund jihadist groups, and Saudi Arabia’s historical promotion of Wahhabism helped create conditions where radical factions could gain traction.
So, I should have been clearer: Gulf intervention in Syria wasn’t necessarily about promoting Wahhabism, but the historical influence of Wahhabi clerics on Gulf foreign policy has had ripple effects in the region. Thanks again for the comment!